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Summary 
This paper addresses the conditions for setting up strict civil liability schemes. For that it 
compares the social efficiency of two main civil liability regimes usually enforced to protect 
the environment: the strict liability regime and the “capped strict liability scheme”. First, it 
shows that the regulator faces an effective dilemma when he has to enforce one of these 
schemes. This because the social cost of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care 
effort) is determined independently of any liability regime. This independency has economic 
consequences. First, victims and polluters pit one against another about the liability regime 
that the government should enforce. Hence, financially constrained polluters prefer the 
ceiling of responsibilities while victims wish to extend the amount of redress under a 
“standard” strict liability. Economic criteria for enforcing a regime rather than another one 
are lacking.  Second, the paper shows that implementing civil strict liability rules may be 
done by setting up care standards as for instance in the nuclear or the maritime sectors and 
demanding to the injurers to comply with them. We show that this goal can be achieved by 
resorting to some friendly monitoring corresponding to frequent random controls with low 
fines rather than few controls that should involve heavy fines. 
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0.  Introduction  
Periodically,  by  their  brutal  occurrence,  anthropogenic  harms  recalls  to  us  that  they  are  the 
inevitable and creepy companions of our contemporaneous Societies: the April 2010 massive oil spill 
in  the  Mexico  Gulf,  the  Tchernobyl  nuclear  accident  in  1986,  the  Nigerian  Coasts  structural  oil 
pollution, the wave of toxic sludge in Kolontar (Hungary) in October 2010, etc. Mostly, because the 
injurers' wealth is insufficient for repairing the entire externality, Society bears a great share of these 
unexpected costs. Governments are becoming aware that these ultra-hazard events need urgently these 
setting up of prevention and mitigation instruments. Among these, the legal instrument occupies a 
growing  place:  Environmental  legislations  intend  both  prompting  the  injurers  to  take  effective 
prevention actions and to gather sufficient funds for repairs.  
This paper narrows this huge scope by comparing the social efficiency of two main civil liability 
regimes usually enforced to protect the environment: strict liability regime and “capped strict liability 
scheme”  that  ceils  the  compensation  amount.  Our  starting  point  is  the  acknowledgement  that 
determining the social cost of the harm is independent from the effectively enforced liability regime. 
Consequently, we put into evidence that if victims and polluters could choose their most preferable 
liability regime, they would pit one against another about what the government “should” enforce. 
Obviously, polluters prefer ceiled liability while victims wish “standard” strict liability. Hence, when 
in position to enforce a liability regime the regulator faces a dilemma: for a given social cost level, he 
pleases  either  the  (potential)  victims  or  the  (potential)  injurers.  Furthermore,  as  an  unexpected 
consequence, the  paper  shows  that  enforcing  care  standards  may  done  by friendly  monitoring  by 
resorting to low fines and frequent controls rather than criminal heavy fines. 
The  pioneering  works  of  Summers  (1983)  and  Shavell  (1986)  emphasized  that  the  limited 
injurers‟ wealth prevent the complete internalization of the harm. Beyond this, Shavell (1986) showed 
that  injurers  with limited assets engage  in risky  activities too often and take too little care. This 
viewpoint was disputed by Beard (1990): strict liability would involve two opposite effects on injurers' 
incentives to invest in risk reduction technologies. On one hand, as the expected payment due to 
liability is less than the real expected damage, the marginal benefit of prevention is too small and the 
firm will under invest
1 or, conversely could overinvest. Hence, the tort victims effectively subsidize 
the firm‟s pecuniary investments. In a complete information economy and no bankruptcy assumption, 
Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) show that bank as well as injurer can be considered as liable to 
generate optimal incentives. This opened the door to vicarious liability involving the liability of the 
injurer‟s financial partners. A rich literature ensued on the moral hazard relationships between the 
lenders and the injurer and the definition of incentive instruments to minimize the risk of the injurer. 
By considering the effects of imposing liability on lenders, Pitchford (1995) shows that they have to 
                                                           
1 See also Friehe (2007). 3 
 
anticipate future liability, and this leads them to require a higher interest rate in compensation. For 
Boyer and Laffont (1997) partial bank liability is preferable to complete liability They show this, in a 
two-period model with preventive effort to be made by the firm in the first period, and possibly 
accident  taking  place in  the  second.  They  study  the  impact  of  bank  liability  on  the  safety  effort 
optimality. This way is pursued by Balkenborg (2001) (partial lender liability), Boyer and Porrini 
(2006) (2008) who explore the relationships of banks and firms under tort law where the decision of 
the court is random.  
The extensions of Beard (1990)‟s study the consequence of limited liability. Boyd and Ingberman 
(1994), Dari-Mattiacci (2006),  Friehe (2007) analyze the consequences of bounding strict liability. 
They show that capping the repairs amount can lead firms to increase their prevention effort and, then, 
contribute  to  improve  the  social  welfare  that  standard  strict  liability  struggles  to  meet.  Recently, 
Shavell (2005) shows that involving judgment-proof firms to purchase liability insurance can induce 
them to internalize the risky activities costs. Submitting injurers to mandatory insurance, constitutes a 
strong incentive to adopt better safety care. 
Our paper focuses on the fact that, sometimes, ultra-hazardous harm may be so high that even if 
the whole financing line ran to ruin, a large part of the damage would remain externalized (for instance 
after a severe nuclear harm). Hence, the conditions that can reduce the probability of risk matter as 
more as the repairs question. That explains the importance for parties of the relevant liability regime to 
enforce and the ways by which the regulator implements the associated optimal safety measures.  
In a first part, we define the concrete stakes of the implementation of either a strict liability regime 
or a capped one by referring to the civil liability of the electro-nuclear industry. A second one defines 
the  structure  of  the  model  and  shows  that  the  social  cost  determination  is  independent  from  the 
liability  regime.  A  third  part  analyzes  the  enforcement  process.  A  fourth  part  analyses  its  legal 
consequence. A fifth part concludes. 
1.  Standard vs Strict liability regime: The populations’ concern 
In the eighties, the USA under the CERCLA-Superfund framework
2 enforced strict liability rules. 
Twenty-five years later, in 2004, Europe  followed this way by adopting the European Directive on 
environmental liability
3. Under these legal apparatus, injurers have to repair fully the harm they have 
caused regardless of guilt even if not at fault or negligent and, this, independently of how careful they 
                                                           
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 CERCLA, SUPERFUND, 
codified in Public Health, 42 USC, §9601 et seq.. CERCLA associates several liability modes: strict liability, 
“joint and several” and retroactive liability. 
3 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L143/56, 30/4/04. 4 
 
acted. Furthermore, strict liability frees the victim of the burden of proving any faulty or negligent 
behavior from the injurer‟s side.  
Compared to CERCLA, the European directive framework distinguishes two liability schemes. 
The  first  one  applies  to  the  dangerous  or  potentially  dangerous occupational activities. These are 
mainly agricultural or industrial ones that require a license under the Directive on integrated pollution 
prevention and control (IPPC)
4. The operator may be held responsible even if not at fault. The second 
regime applies to all other occupational activities. The operator will be held liable only if at fault or 
negligent. The scope is limited to species or natural habitats protected by Community legislation under 
actual damage or imminent threat of damage. CERCLA is  restricted to the cleanup of abandoned 
hazardous waste sites.  
The maritime sector and the electro -nuclear industry apply both specific strict liability regimes 
that  ceil the amount of redress . The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage of 2001 states the strict liability of ship-owners for all types of pollution 
damage caused by bunker oil. However, this liability is subject to the limits of applicable national or 
international regimes not exceeding an amount calculated in accordance with the amended 1976 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime   Claims. Concerning the maritime transport, 
compensation for oil pollution is regulated by the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution (CLC) and the International Convention setting up. The Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
(Fund Convention) establishes a two-tier liability system built upon the (limited) strict liability for the 
ship owner and a collectively financed fund which provides supplementary compensation to victims of 
oil pollution damage who have not obtained full compensation. The full compensation notion does not 
apply to the environment as a whole, but only t o people privately concerned by personal losses in a 
civil strict liability regulation context. 
The nuclear civil liability is ruled by international conventions
5. These one  establish a strict 
liability regime channeled exclusively to the operators of the nuclear installations. If this liability is 
absolute, it is limited in time and amount which is set to €1.500M (World Nuclear Association 2009). 
Hence, the liable agent is exposed to a level of redress substantially lower than the amount of the 
harm. This faded responsibility should act as an investment incentive for firms. The nuclear operators 
                                                           
4 These are activities  which discharge heavy  metals into water or the air, installations producing dangerous 
chemical substances, waste management activities (including landfills and incinerators) and activities concerning 
genetically modified organisms and micro-organisms. 
5 IAEA's Vienna Convention of 1963, OECE‟s Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy  of  1960  and  the  Convention  on  Supplementary  Compensation  for  Nuclear  Damage  (CSC)  of  1997 
amended in 2003 and the OECD Paris (and Brussels) Conventions Amending Protocols of 2004. 5 
 
are relieved of the burden of potentially ruinous liability claims
6. However, the internalization process 
remains structurally incomplete and the victims‟ rights
 7 are seriously impaired.  
Under strict cap liability, the potential injurers tend to lower their level of due care (Faure and Hu, 
2006), (Faure and Wang 2008)).  
At the political level, this analysis is echoed by opponents to the introduction of such liability 
regimes
8. This raises the question of the status of potential victims related to the redress question. 
Generally, literature rather focuses on the polluters‟ behavior. Hence, liability ceilings are detrimental 
for  victims  and  can  be  imposed  without  considering  their  welfare.  Potential  injurers  define  their 
optimal level of safety without assessing the consequences for the society
9. The recent example of 
India shows the importance of  the debate on  caps on in the population. Until August 2010, Indian 
nuclear energy was ruled by a “standard strict liability” regime. India stood out with neither a national 
nuclear  liability  legislation,  nor  membership  in  one  of  the  international  conventions.  Hence,  the 
operator  is  a  public  firm  (Nuclear  Power  Corporation  of  India)  and  the  government  was  fully 
responsible for compensation in the event of a nuclear hazard. The Indian nuclear industry is expected 
to grow several folds from the present 4,120 Mw to at least 10,000 megawatts by 2020. This program 
involves the participation of three major partners: Russia, France and United States. In France and 
Russia, the State plays the role of insurer for foreign investments. In the US, after an accident, the first 
$375 million is paid by the insurer(s) of the plant. It is mandatory to insure the plant. Beyond that, up 
to US$ 10 billion is paid out of a fund jointly contributed by the “operators” as mandated by the Price-
Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act. As a consequence, because of bilateral agreements under 
Bush administration, USA induces India to adopt a capped liability regime to allow its private firms to 
operate under a limited liability as required by the US nuclear insurers. Indian Government in 2009 
prepared a specific law: „The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill 2010‟ which caps to about $65 
million the compensation that foreign nuclear operators would be liable for in the event of a nuclear 
accident and the Indian government's liability would be limited to about $385 million. However, by 
March 2010, under the pressure of its opposition, the Indian government withdrew the introduction of 
the bill and finally adopted it by August 2010. Beyond the effective conclusion, this example shows 
that opinions are becoming sensitive about how are repaired technological harms. 
                                                           
6  More explicit still is The “Exposé des Motifs” for the 1960 Paris Convention that considers that “unlimited 
liability  could  easily  lead  to  the  ruin  of  the  operator  without  affording  any  substantial  contribution  to 
compensation for the damage caused” (Exposé des Motifs, Motif 45) or still (Schwartz, 2006:39) 
7 See for instance (Boyd 2001, p.47):” On the other hand, these benefits to regulated industries must be weighed 
against  the  obvious  drawback  of  capped  liability:  namely,  that  environmental  costs  above  the  cap  will  be 
uncompensated by responsible parties.” 
8 In India, for instance, the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP), in its Appeal against the 
Proposed Civil Nuclear Liability [Cap] Bill ask the Indian government to increase the level safety considering 
the choice for the nuclear energy industry.  In http://www.sacw.net/article1288.html 
9 Generally, this society is reduced to the injurers‟ interest. However, Shavell (1982) took into considerations the 
utility of victims in an insurance model under several liability regimes (negligence and strict liability). He dealt 
the question of the desirability to sell insurances to injurers.  6 
 
2.  The model 
We  consider  two representative  agents: a  group  of  victims  and a  unique polluter.  Define  the 
following notation. 
-  ?, the maximum potential damage due to an accident, ? > 0;  
-  𝑒, the level of care effort, 𝑒 ∈  0,∞ , 𝑒 decreases the probability of an accident of a major 
consequence ?. 
-  𝑝(𝑒), the probability of a severe harm with 0 < 𝑝 𝑒  < 1; 𝑝′ 𝑒  < 0 and 𝑝′′ 𝑒  > 0; 
-  ?, the injurer‟s wealth, ? > ? > 0 (Shavell 1986). This means that the polluter is judgment-
proof if some ultra-hazardous event occurs. 
-  ?, the level of repairs, ? ≥ ? ≥ 0; 
-  ?, The amount of the ceiling under a capped liability regime,  0 ≤ ? ≤ ? < ?. 
? is the victims‟ cost function and ? the one of the injurer. Both agent categories are supposed 
risk-neutral.  Let  us  consider ?(𝑒) called  „repair  function‟, ?(𝑒) ∈  0,?  depends  on  the  liability 
regime. Furthermore, let us notice the expected cost or disutility functions of the victim ??? and the 
injurer ???, respectfully: 
??? =  ? − ?(𝑒)  𝑝 𝑒  +  1 − 𝑝 𝑒  .0 =  ? − ?(𝑒)  𝑝 𝑒           [1]  
And, 
??? =  𝑒 + ? 𝑒  𝑝 𝑒  + (1 − 𝑝 𝑒 )𝑒 = 𝑒 + ? 𝑒 𝑝 𝑒 ,         [2]  
We can establish the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Under the assumption of neutrality to risk of injurers and victims, the social cost 
function is independent from the enforced strict liability regime. 
Proof: The proof helps us keeping presenting the model. Proposition 1 is drawn from Shavell 
(1982), Shavell (1986) or still, Beard(1990) and is extended to the questioning of liability regimes. 
The  social  cost  function  (???) is  the  sum  of  the  agent‟s  disutility  function  (or  cost  function) 
corresponding to the cost of prevention and the expected cost of compensating a major accident for the 
polluter  and  the  incurred  expected  cost  the  victim,  Shavell  (1982),  Shavell  (1986).  In  fine,  this 
corresponds to the sum of the cost of safety 𝑒 and the expect cost of total damage ?𝑝(𝑒) and this 
independently of the liability regime:  
??? =  ??? + ??? =  ? − ?(𝑒)  𝑝 𝑒  + 𝑒 + ? 𝑒 𝑝 𝑒  = ?𝑝 𝑒  + 𝑒.      [3] 
To  verify  the  independency  from  the  liability  regime,  it  is  sufficient  to  replace ?(𝑒) by  the 
following noticeable values. Precisely, when no liability rule applies (abbreviated as NL), the function 
is ? 𝑒  = 0, [3] ensues automatically. Under, the “standard” strict liability (SL), the full ownership of 
the injurer is engaged minus the share dedicated to safety. Then, ? 𝑒  = ? − 𝑒. At last, under the 
capped strict liability (CL), the amount of repairs is bounded: ? 𝑒  = ?,? > ? > 0. The respective 
functions are respectively for the injurer and the victims: 7 
 
i)  ??𝑁𝐿 = 𝑒,  and ??𝑁𝐿 = ? 𝑝 𝑒  for the absolute lack of liability,  
ii)  ???𝐿 = (? − 𝑒)𝑝 𝑒  + 𝑒, and (? − ?) 𝑝 𝑒  for the strict liability
10, 
iii)  ???𝐿 = ? 𝑝 𝑒  + 𝑒, and. ??? =  ? − ?  𝑝 𝑒  for the capped liability. 
Then, we can easily check, that, whatever the liability regime,  
??𝑁𝐿  = ???𝐿 = ???𝐿 = ?? = ?𝑝 𝑒  + 𝑒      [4] 
Remark 1: Under the lack of civil liability rules, the polluter is not held as liable after a severe 
accident on the ground of civil law. However, this does not mean that the polluter will not make 
prevention expenses to self-protection, even if he devotes a suboptimal amount of care. Hence, he will 
spend the amount 𝑒 for prevention (𝑒 ≥ 0) without being induced to pay for repairs. The regulator 
wishes to minimize the impact of a severe harm. 
Remark 2: Under strict liability the responsible polluter should pay for the whole damage he 
caused (? = ?). However, he cannot compensate victims fully but in proportion of his own assets. 
Economic literature calls this situation “limited liability” because redress is bounded by the owner‟s 
wealth. After a severe event he will pay back ? − 𝑒 to victims (his initial asset minus the cost of the 
safety effort). Hence, under a strict liability regime, the victims benefit of a better situation than before 
because their effective damage is (? − ?) and  ? − ?  under a capped liability regime with  ? −
?<(?−?). 
In spite of [4], the victims and the injurer are sensitive to the nature of the liability regime that can 
alleviate or weigh down the burden of the social cost. This is shown by proposition 2 (we exclude the 
lack of any liability for obvious reasons):  
Proposition  2:  If  they  could  choose  the  liability  regime,  the  choices  of  each  category  may  be 
described as:  
a)  Injurers: The injurer prefers the ceiling of repairs to strict liability in so far that there exists 
𝑒 ≥ 0 such that ? − ? ≥ 𝑒, and the reverse for ? − ? < 𝑒. He his indifferent for equality. 
b)  The victims prefer strict liability for ? − ? > 𝑒 or any scheme that engages the higher amount 
of the injurer’s wealth for repair (in the lack of any another compensation scheme) when 
? − ? ≤ 𝑒.  
Proof: It is sufficient to assess the preferences of each category of agents under the different 
regimes for cases a) and b).  
a)  The injurer’s preferences  
If the injurer could express his opinion, he would choose the liability regime that minimizes 
the safety cost. We can check that for the interval set 𝑒 ∈  0,? :  
i)  ???𝐿(𝑒) ≥ ???𝐿(𝑒) ⟹ 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒  𝑝 𝑒  ≥ 𝑒 + ?𝑝 𝑒  ⟹ ? ≥ 𝑒 + ?,   [5] 
(Indifference for equality). 
Consequently,  the  cost  of  strict  liability ???𝐿 is  higher  than ???𝐿 for ? − ? ≥ 𝑒 and  the 
injurer prefers the capped liability regime to the strict liability one.  
ii)  ???𝐿 𝑒  >  ???𝐿 𝑒  ⇒ 𝑒 + ?𝑝 𝑒  > 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒  𝑝 𝑒  ⇒ ? − ? < 𝑒.    [6] 
                                                           
10 This function is convex and it is studied in appendix 1. 8 
 
That means that if the required cost for risk coverage is ? < 𝑒 + ?, then the injurer will prefer 
the  standard  strict  liability  regime.  This  situation  deserves  some  attention  because  it  has  been 
described by Shavell (1986) when injurers with insufficient wealth undertake risky activities. It is 
typically an adverse selection question. 
b)  The victims’ preferences  
As above, we compare both costs: 
???𝐿 𝑒  ≥ ???𝐿 𝑒  ⇒  ? − ? 𝑝 𝑒  ≥  ? −  ? − 𝑒  𝑝 𝑒  ⇒  ? − ? ≥ 𝑒    [7] 
Hence, the same condition that makes the injurer to prefer capped to strict liability induces the 
overturned effect for victims: they prefer strict liability regime to a capped one. Obviously, for 
all 𝑒 such that ? − ? < 𝑒,  the  reverse  is  true,  i.e. the  capped  regime  is  preferred to strict 
liability  regime.  However,  this  case  has  to  be  considered  cautiously.  Indeed,  under  this 
condition, the victims‟ uncompensated share is ℎ(𝑒) = ? −  𝑒 + ?  < 0. Hence, victims will 
prefer cap liability regime for all value of 𝑒 such that for 𝑒 ∈  0,𝑒0 , (where 𝑒0 is that value 
for  which ℎ(𝑒0) = ? −  𝑒0 + ?  = 0).  Beyond  this  value: (? − ? < 𝑒),  and  victims  feel 
indifferent to both regimes because the damage remains uncompensated 
The above propositions are used then to set up the indeterminacy of the regulator‟s choice.  
Proposition 3: From propositions 1and 2, with risk neutral agents, economic criteria for enforcing a 
strict liability regime (capped or standard) are lacking. 
 Proof: From the first order conditions concerning the social cost: 𝑒 + ?𝑝(𝑒), it exists 𝑒∗ ≥ 0 
such that ??′ 𝑒∗  = 0, i.e.  𝑝′(𝑒∗) = −
1
?  and 𝑒∗ = 𝑝′−1
 −
1
? .  𝑒∗ is determined independently of any 
liability regime. The level of 𝑒∗ is independent from the level of the injurers‟ wealth. As a result, 𝑒∗ 
may be such that either 𝑒∗ ≥ ?, or 𝑒∗ < ?. Obviously, for 𝑒∗ ≥ ?, the injurer cannot conform to 𝑒∗ 
because this level exhaust his own resources. However, this situation cannot be dismissed as such and 
calls for attention. Concretely, 𝑒∗ ≥ ?, are these conjectures for which the risk is so high that private 
firms cannot undertake the project. Overstepping it is under the perfect knowledge that they are unable 
to meet their liability. However, we have to notice that the regulator has few market-based instruments 
at his disposal to forbid the activity except to resort to criminal law and prohibiting then the activity.  
Then, we consider the case for which:  𝑒∗ < ?.  
-  If ? − ? ≥ 𝑒∗,  the  injurer  prefers  capped  liability  to  strict  liability  while  the  victims  the 
reverse and both of them are indifferent if by chance 𝑒∗,  ? − ? = 𝑒∗ . 
-  If ? − ? < 𝑒∗,  the  injurer  will  prefer  strict  liability  to  its  ceiling,  while  the  victims  are 
indifferent to both regime because at ? and 𝑒∗ they know that they will receive less than the 
cap, i.e.  ? − 𝑒∗ < ?. Furthermore, we can ask whether in a regulated economy, concerning 
ultra-hazardous activities, such a conjecture is realistic, because, as in the nuclear industry or 
the maritime transport, insufficient funded operators are prohibited to act. Hence, the only 
relevant situation (from a legal viewpoint) is the case for which ? − ? ≥ 𝑒∗. Then, for a legal 9 
 
standard : 𝑒∗ that minimizes the social cost function, for ? − ? ≥ 𝑒∗, the regulator can choose 
neither to favor the injurers nor the victims:  
???𝐿 𝑒∗  > ???𝐿(𝑒∗) and ???𝐿 𝑒∗  > ???𝐿 𝑒∗  
We reach here the announced regulator‟s dilemma. Indeed, admitting that the regulator could 
enforce the safety level e∗, it remains to him to implement a liability scheme. Then, the dilemma is 
this. Once the regulator has determined the socially acceptable level of safety effort 𝑒∗, what liability 
regime to enforce? If on one hand, he opts for the capped liability regime then he will favor the 
injurers (because the level of cost is lower for them than with strict liability). On the other hand, the 
reverse choice (strict liability) means that he favors the victims instead of the injurers. Proposition 2 
shows that the victims prefer always a strict liability regime rather than the capped one except for 
value of 𝑒 such that 𝑒 = 𝑒0 where they become at most indifferent between them. As a consequence, 
there is some irrelevancy between the determination of the optimal social of care and the choice of a 
given civil strict liability regime. This last one cannot be chosen on economic criteria.  
These situations are summarized in the following example. We develop a graphical illustration 
by considering an exponential law of parameter λ > 0 defined on the care level e (and not on time as 
usually). The density function is 𝑝 𝑒  = 𝜆 ??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒). We can check that it has the required properties 
with: 𝑝′(𝑒) = −𝜆2??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒) < 0 and p′′ 𝑒  = 𝜆3??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒).  Then,  we  can  conceive the  different 
expectation  cost  functions  described  in  the  analysis,  let  respectively  be  these  ones: ???𝐿 = 𝑒 +
 ? − 𝑒 𝜆??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒) ,  ???𝐿 = 𝑒 + ?𝜆 ??𝑝??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒)?? = 𝑒 + ? 𝜆??𝑝??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒) ,  ???𝐿 = (? −
 ? − 𝑒 )𝜆??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒)and ???𝐿 = (? − ?)𝜆??𝑝(−𝜆𝑒). 
Graphic 1 shows these relationships. On the y-axis, successively one can see the value of 
damages when 𝑒 = 0 (and λ = 1), hence,  ???𝐿 0  = ?,??(0) = ?,  ???𝐿 0  = ?. On the x-axis are 
represented the optimum value of care for the injurers and the social planner.  
[Insert Graphic 1] 
Another stake concerns the effective capacity of the regulator to enforce the optimal level of 
care. Indeed, without any other constraint than the enforced liability regime, the injurer will choose the 
optimal effort level that minimizes his cost. Indeed, let 𝑒?𝐿, and 𝑒?𝐿 be respectively the polluter‟s 
optimal safety effort level for, respectively, the capped limited liability and the strict liability regimes. 
Proposition 4 shows that 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒∗.  
Proposition 4: Considering neutral to risk injurers, and ? ≥ 𝑒 + ?, then, 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒∗.  
Proof in annex 2. 
Proposition 4 means that in so far that ? ≥ 𝑒 + ?, the strict liability regime induces higher 





3.  Enforcing the optimal social safety effort 
According the nature of risks, there are many ways to enforce the socially optimum level of 
care.  Hence,  for 𝑒∗ ≥ ? (the  level  of  security  required  is  such  that  it  exceeds  the  wealth  of  the 
polluter), the regulator knows that imposing 𝑒∗ involves stopping the injurer‟s economic activity. Two 
cases have to be considered then. If the level of damage is such that it may have irreversible impact on 
wealth and the environment, then, the precautionary principle should apply as an abstention principle 
and the risky production (instable molecules in the chemical sector for instance) should be forbidden.  
However, the government may consider that in spite of dangers, the risky activity is worthy 
for the economy. He faces then a kind of dilemma. He cannot enforce 𝑒∗ and he knows that the level 
chosen by the injurers will be either 𝑒?𝐿 if he chooses a strict liability regime or 𝑒?𝐿 if he settles a cap 
with 𝑒∗ > 𝑒?𝐿 > 𝑒?𝐿. However, the government has to implement 𝑒∗ and he has to find some device 
to achieve this objective.  
Now,  let 𝑔,𝑔 > 0 be  the  polluter‟s  total  receipt,  and  ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒  = 𝑔 − ???𝐿 𝑒  and,
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒  = 𝑔 − ???𝐿 𝑒  be the net expected payoff functions under, respectfully, a strict or a capped 
liability  regime.  By  fixing, 𝑒∗,  the  expected  net  payoff  of  the  injurer  will  be ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  = 𝑔 −
???𝐿 𝑒∗   and ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  = 𝑔 − ???𝐿 𝑒∗ , with naturally, ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  ≤ ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗ . At this level, if the 
injurer  is  forced  to  apply 𝑒∗,  he  will  go  on  producing  if ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0.  The  following  table 
summarizes the different conjectures: 
 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0  
?𝗱𝐿 𝑒∗  ≥ 0 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  ≤ 0 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  < 0 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  < 0 




Can comply only under Capped 




(a)  (b)  (c) 
Table 1 
Before going further, it is necessary to summarize the conditions for which these instruments 
have to be designed. First, the socially desired care level 𝑒∗has to be such that 𝑒∗ < ? and, second, 
𝑔 − ???𝐿 𝑒∗  ≥ 0 or/and 𝑔 − ???𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0. The problem is then to define an instrument such that, 
the injurer is induced to move from his equilibrium position 𝑒?𝐿 or 𝑒?𝐿 towards 𝑒∗. If these conditions 
are not met, either the government should definitively stop the production (precautionary principle) or 
accept that production will be achieved out of social efficiency criteria. This may be the case under 
exceptional conditions as war time for instance.  
Symmetric  information  between  the  injurer  and  the  regulator  following  is  assumed.  This 
means that when the regulator seeks for information about the injurer, no screen prevents him to 11 
 
access  to full  detail.  However,  the  knowledge  is  not  automatic  and if the  injurer  knows  that the 
regulator‟s monitoring present failures, he can cheat. If, because the government cannot impose 𝑒∗ but 
allows the polluter to produce, then he will achieve a “risk surplus” equivalent to: 
𝗥𝗱 = ?𝗱 𝑒?𝐿  − ?𝗱(𝑒∗) or 𝗥𝗱 = ?𝗱 𝑒?𝐿  − ?𝗱(𝑒∗) following that the regime SL or CP. 
Naturally,  because  𝑒∗ > 𝑒?𝐿 ,  then  ?𝗱 𝑒?𝐿  > ?𝗱(𝑒∗)  and  ΔΠ > 0 .  Because  the  harm  occurs 
randomly, the regulator does not dispose of market based instrument to regulate ex-ante the pollution 
level as under “standard” pollution problems which use of taxes, tradable permits, etc. to induce the 
polluter to adopt the optimum safety level 𝑒∗. However, the regulator can use coercion instruments by 
resorting to  administrative law inducing the polluter to  comply with 𝑒∗. Here, coercion is only a 
complement and not a substitute to enforce strict liability rules compatible with the socially desired 
level of care.  
Hence, the level of fine does not need to be high to induce the polluter to reach the first best social 
level of care. However, before going further, let us note that, implicitly, resorting to coercion is made 
on two levels. The first one is explicit and concerns mainly the definition of the fine level while the 
second one is truly implicit and consists in threatening the polluter to jail or personal bankrupt. The 
threat  will  become  effective,  if,  in  spite  of  warning,  he  does  not  comply  with  the  regulator 
requirement.  To  enforce 𝑒∗,  the  regulator  may  resort  to  a  systematic  control  of  the  polluter‟s 
installations. This may be the case with very low monitoring or control costs. We consider these costs 
as endogenous, included in the fine paid by the polluter if  negligent. Let ?? the probability of no 
control from the regulator side and (1 − ??) the one of control with naturally, 1 ≥ ?? ≥ 0. Hence, the 
higher (1 − ??) is,  the  higher  the  monitoring  of  the  injurer  by  the  regulator.  We  can  now  set  up 
proposition 4. 
Proposition 5: Under the assumption of symmetric information, under the conditions that the injurer’s 
benefit is either: i) ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0 and ?𝗱𝐿 𝑒∗  ≥ 0, or ii) ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  > 0 and ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  ≤ 0, (but not 
?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  < 0 and ?𝗱?𝐿 𝑒∗  < 0),  if  the  regulator  establishes  a  level  of  fine ?∗ such  that ?∗ >
??
 1−?? ∆𝗱𝑘, then a rational injurer will adopt the desired social care level 𝑒∗. 
Proof :  
-  Conditions i) and ii) mean that the activity is profitable under at least one given liability 
regime. They correspond to the case (a) and (b) of table 1. Under iii), it is obvious that no 
injurer has interest to undertake the activity. Here, the goal is to show how a fine, even weak, 
may threaten the injurer to induce him to adopt the efficient safety level.  
-  The injurer‟s choice is either to comply immediately with the required level, in this case 
?𝗱 𝑒∗ 𝑐  = 𝗱(𝑒∗) where 𝑐 means compliance. If the polluter‟s chooses to not comply, his 
expected payoff will be: 
-  ?𝗱 𝑒𝑘 𝑐  = ?􁐸𝗱 𝑒𝑘 𝑐  + (1 − ??)?𝗱 𝑒∗ 𝑐  where 𝑐  corresponds  to  the  non-compliance 
and 𝑘 =  ?𝐿,?𝐿 . Indeed, if the regulator does not exert control, the injurer‟s payoff will be 
?𝗱 𝑒𝑘 𝑐  = ?𝗱 𝑒𝑘 , (?? = 1). If the control is done, and if the injurer  do not comply, this 12 
 
involves  a  cost  of ?𝗱 𝑒∗ 𝑐  =  ?𝗱(𝑒∗  − ? with  a  probability(1 − ??),  (where ? is  the 
amount of the fine for no-compliance). This expression writes too: 
?𝗱 𝑒𝑘 𝑐  = ?􁐸𝗱 𝑒𝑘  +  1 − ??  ?𝗱(𝑒∗  − ?), 𝑘 =  ?𝐿,?𝐿 . 
Putting it otherwise, ?􁐸𝗱 𝑒𝑘  means that the injurer expects to win ?𝗱 𝑒𝑘  with a probability ?? 
and  ?𝗱(𝑒∗  − ?) with  a  probability  1 − ?? .  Hence,  one  may  consider  that  the  injurer  will  be 
indifferent to both situations (comply for the safety level e∗ or not), if the following relationship is 
verified: 
?𝗱 𝑒𝑘 𝑐  = ?𝗱 𝑒∗ 𝑐  
or, still, 
?􁐸𝗱 𝑒𝑘  +  1 − ??  ?𝗱(𝑒∗  − ?) = ?𝗱(𝑒∗), 




 1−??  ?𝗱(𝑒∗) − ?𝗱 𝑒𝑘   =
??
 1−?? ∆𝗱𝑘, 
Reaching this point we have to note that the injurer is facing the following choice. If he 
complies with the regulator‟s standard then he will gain Π(𝑒∗) with a probability equal to 1. Or, if he 
does  not,  either  the  regulator  exerts  control  and  he  will  gain  less  than  in  the  previous 
situation( Π(𝑒∗  − ?)), or he wins the bet and gets Π(𝑒∗). The bet depends on the intensity of the 
control. We have to note that if ?? = 1/2 then the expected gain is the net surplus of the risk taker, but 
this one is not certain as in the case in which the regulator does not exert any control. The higher the 
probability of a control is, the lesser the level of the fine. Hence, as the control increases, the level of 
the expected gain is less than the risk taker surplus. To discourage the temptation of cheating behavior 
the regulator could consider ?∗ such that ?∗ > ? > 0, with ?∗ = ? + 𝜀, 𝜀 > 0. Hence, the injurer will 
be led to adopt the desired social care level. ?∗ has to be lump sum and not proportional to the level of 
sub-optimal care effort, (i.e. a decreasing fine associated to the effort level 𝑒∗). Indeed, with lump-sum 
fine, even if the injurer increases its effort level, but stay short of 𝑒∗, he will be forced to supply 𝑒∗ and 
will be fined at ?∗. Consequently, it is of no interest for him to undersize his safety investment. There 
is an inverse relationship between the probability of frequency of control and the level of the fine. This 
may have impact on the cost of control. Indeed, very few frequent controls may induce the regulatory 
agency  to  spend  heavy  check  costs.  Hence,  looking  at  the  ratio 
??
 1−??  and  its  evolution  can  help 
understanding different enforcement styles. This point will be dealt in the next section.  
4.  Legal considerations and others 
Administrative requirements for environmental prevention and liability rules are associated. 
Generally,  these  are  regulatory  agencies  that  enforce  environmental  laws  and  rules.  For  instance, 
quality of water is managed by water regulatory agencies, wildlife, landscape etc. by environmental 
agencies  etc.  These  agencies  dispose  of  a  wide  range  of  enforcing  instruments.  Pollution  control 13 
 
legislation typically provides for licenses, authorizations, etc. and the use of prosecution powers are 
only a small element of this set of mechanisms. Sanctions can be either explicit, for instance, fines the 
cessation or restriction of previously authorized activities or implicit by a step by step process which 
can lead to prosecution. These elements are activated to impose the optimal social level of prevention. 
This range of means may supported by our model. Indeed, let us consider  𝑘 =
??
 1−??  . This ratio may 
express the policy choice of the regulator. For instance, 𝑘 → 0 means frequent control and a high 
incentive to adopt the optimal social safety effort e∗. This may be considered as a friendly monitoring. 
The frequent controls induce the injurer to adopt almost “naturally” the correct preventive actions. 
This process describes the working of regulatory agencies that accompany the working of dangerous 
facilities or activities. The permanent threat of  non-criminal sanctions is a deterrent instrument to 
oppose to the deviation temptation.  
Conversely, few controls should call for high sanctions. This is seldom the case in concrete 
situations because if the probability of not being controlled is high (𝑘 → 1) , then, the fine should be 
almost  infinite.  This  matter  of  fact  enlightens the  traditional  distinction  between  routine  cases  of 
environmental harm and crimes. The first one results from general activities while the second one are 
committed  with  a  view  to  personal  or  business  advantage.  The  former  case  civil  penalties  are 
administered  through  civil  or  administrative  means  (such  as  standardized  „fines‟  for  breaches  of 
license conditions) while criminal sanctions are associated to the worst type of offences (Woods  and 
Macrory,  (2003)). 
[insert scheme 1] 
These relationships are  figured  in  the  scheme  1  that  shows the consequences  of  different 
policies from the regulator side. When controls are frequent, the regulator plays an educative role and 
his coercion role increases with decreasing controls. For values of 𝑘 below ½, relationships between 
the polluter and the regulator are discontinuous, but the injurer knows that the control can be frequent 
and the inducement to default not high. The situation changes for few or very few controls. The only 
way for the regulator to deter cheating behaviors or to induce agents to comply with the required 
safety effort is to fine heavily the polluter. Very low probability of control calls for very high fine 
level.  
5.  Conclusion 
 
It  has  been  shown  that  the  regulator  faces  an  effective  dilemma  because  the  social  cost 
determination of a severe harm (and the associated optimum care effort) is determined independently 
from the liability regimes. The key of indecision lies in the opposite preference about the liability 
scheme between injurers and victims. For a given social optimum level of safety effort, injurers prefer 
the ceiling of repairs and victims a standard strict liability regime. This last one extends the repairs to 14 
 
the integrality of the injurers‟ wealth. Hence, enforcing a specific scheme rather than another one 
involves that the regulator favors a category against another one.  
This dilemma is not an ideological matter in which a “green” regulator would enforce strict 
liability while a “liberal” one would favor polluters. In fact, choosing a capped strict liability regime 
may be done on “technical” or strategic reasons. For instance,  if strict liability involves negative 
payoff for the injurers and if the production is considered as vital for the economy, then capping the 
repairs guarantees the production effectiveness. This leads us to the second point analyzed in this 
paper i.e. the way by which the optimal level of care is enforced in a symmetric information context. 
Hence, the regulator can choose to monitor closely the injurer with quite low fines for no compliance. 
As  controls  are  less  frequent,  cheating  deterrence  involves  higher  level  fines.  As  a  consequence, 
ideally, if controls are numerous, the enforcement of the optimal level could be achieved with very 
low fine threat. This puts into perspective the relationships between administrative control, criminal 
law and the enforcement of strict liability regimes. It seems that administrative coercion is necessary 
to enforce the relevant (optimal) level of care and the resort to criminal law with heavy sanction 
should  be  quite  exceptional  and  punish  only  crimes  to  the  environment.  However,  a  “friendly” 
monitoring corresponding to repeated control with mandatory compliance to the optimal level of care 
effort, in certain circumstances, may bring essential information to the regulator. However, for very 
sensitive sectors, gathering information may be either too costly or impossible and, consequently, 
defining incentives tools is necessary. Another direction to deal with concerns the introduction of 
insurance policies as it is compulsory in many environmental or energetic sectors (risky facilities, 
maritime transportation of oil, nuclear industry…). this paper has been written under the assumption of 
symmetric information between the injurer and the regulatory institution. This assumption should be 
relaxed in a new contribution. 
 
6.  References 
Balkenborg, D., (2001), “How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment Proof Firms 
and Environmental Risk: Comment,” American Economic Review, 91,731-738. 
Boyd,  J.,  Ingberman,  D.E.  (1997).  “The  search  for  deep  pockets:  is  “extended  liability 
expensive liability?” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13, 232–258. 
Boyer, M., Laffont, J.-J. (1997). “Environmental risks and bank liability”. European Economic 
Review 41, 1427–1459. 
Boyer, M., Porrini, D., (2006), “Sharing Liability between Banks and Firms: The Case of 
Industrial Safety Risk,” chap. 13 in M. Boyer, Y. Hiriart and D. Martimort (ed.), Frontiers in the 
Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability, Ashgate Pub.  
Boyer, M., Porrini, D., (2008), “The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental 
Disasters: Lessons for Optimal Insurance Regulation,” Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance: Issue 
and Practice, 33, 337-362. 
Boyd J. (2001) “Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and 
Assurance  Rules  Fulfilling  Their  Promise?“  Resources  for  the  Future,  Discussion  Paper  01–42, 
http://www.rff.org 
Dari-Mattiacci, G. (2006), "Limiting Limited Liability", Economics Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 1 
pp. 1-7. 15 
 
Faure M. and Fiore, G. K., (2009) “An Economic Analysis Of The Nuclear Liability Subsidy 
School of Law”, Pace Environmental Law Review, Vol.26, pp.419-448. 
Dari Mattiacci, G., and F.Parisi, (2003), “The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, 
Secondary Liability and Mandatory Insurance,” The International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 
453-475. 
Faure M. and Hu, J. (2006), “Prevention And Compensation of Marine Pollution Damage: 
Recent Developments in Europe, China And the US”, Kluwer Law International  
Faure, M., Wang, H. (2008), “Financial caps for oil pollution damage: a historical mistake?”, 
32(4) Marine Policy, 592-606. 
Friehe T., (2007),  “A note on judgment proofness and risk aversion”, European Journal of 
Law and Economics, Volume 24, Number 2. 
Shavell,  S.  (1982)  “On  Liability  and  Insurance”,  Bell  Journal  of  Economics, Volume  13, 
Number 1, Spring 1982, pages 120-132) 
Shavell,  S.  (1986).  “The  judgment  proof  problem”.  International  Review  of  Law  and 
Economic,  6, 45–58. 
Shavell,  S.  (2005),  “Minimum  asset  requirements  and  compulsory  liability  insurance  as 
solution to the judgment-proof  problem”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.36, N°1. 
Shavell,  S.  (2005),  “Minimum  asset  requirements  and  compulsory  liability  insurance  as 
solution to the judgment-proof  problem”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.36, N°1, Spring,2005, 
pp.63-77.  
Sykes, A.O. (1984) “The Economics of Vicarious Liability.” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 91 pp. 
168–206. 
Schwartz, J. A. (2006), “International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response to 
Chernobyl”,  
http://www.npec-web.org/files/DRAFT-20071105-Froggatt NuclearThirdPartyInsurancePaper.pdf 
Summers,  J.  (1983)  “The  Case  of  the  Disappearing  Defendant:  An  Economic  Analysis”, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 132, 145-85.  
Woods M. and Macrory, R., (2003), Environmental Civil Penalties—A More Proportionate 
Response to Regulatory Breach, London: UCL. 
 























   




 1 − ?? 
 
𝑘 → 0 
infrequent checks,  
Discontinuous relationship,  
Coercion threat 
Frequent checks,  
Continuous relationship,  
Educative role  
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Study of the function 
 𝜑 𝑒  = 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝(𝑒) 
𝑒 ∈  0,?  and 1 ≥ 𝑝 𝑒  > 0. Furthermore, by assumption, 𝑝′ 𝑒  > 0, and 𝑝′
′ 𝑒  < 0 with 
lim𝑒⟶0 𝑝(𝑒) = 1.  
-  Study to the limits of 𝜑 𝑒 : 
lim
𝑒⟶0
𝜑 𝑒  = lim
𝑒⟶0
 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝(𝑒)  =? 
lim
𝑒⟶?
𝜑 𝑒  = lim
𝑒⟶?
 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝(𝑒)  =? 
𝜑′ 𝑒  =  𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝 𝑒  
′
= 1 + ?𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑒𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑝(𝑒) 
-  Study of 𝜑′ 𝑒 : 
As it is difficult to define values 𝑒∗ such that 𝜑′ 𝑒∗  = 0, we study its behavior on 𝑒 ∈  0,? . 
-  lim𝑒⟶0 𝜑′ 𝑒  =lim𝑒⟶0 1 + ?𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑒𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑝(𝑒)  =  ? − 𝑒 𝑝′ 𝑒  = ?𝑝′ 𝑒  < 0 
-  lim𝑒⟶? 𝜑′ 𝑒  =lim𝑒⟶? 1 + ?𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑒𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑝(𝑒)  = lim𝑒⟶? 1 − 𝑝(𝑒)  > 0 
Conditions for having  
  1 + ?𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑒𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑝 𝑒  > 0 
 1 − 𝑝 𝑒  > (𝑒 − ?)𝑝′ 𝑒  > 0 
We see here that as 𝑒 increases  1 − 𝑝 𝑒  increases because 𝑝 𝑒  decreases, however, as 𝑒 
increases, (𝑒 − ?) decreases (for 𝑒 < ?) and is negative while 𝑝′ 𝑒  is negative, and their 
product is positive. 
For low value of 𝑒, this relationship is verified: 
0 < 1 − 𝑝 𝑒  < (𝑒 − ?)𝑝′ 𝑒  
As a consequence, there is 𝑒∗ which cancels 1 + ?𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑒𝑝′ 𝑒  − 𝑝(𝑒). For right values of 
𝑒∗ < 𝑒, the function is increasing and decreasing on the left hand side 𝑒∗ > 𝑒. 
 
Appendix 2 
Demonstration of proposition 4. 
-  (a) Demonstration that 𝑒?𝐿 ≥ 𝑒?𝐿 
For that we assume the reverse, 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒?𝐿. Hence, let us consider ???𝐿 = 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝(𝑒) 





We replace this value in ???𝐿, and, 





Let us take the first order derivative of ???𝐿′, and we look for the value of this function for 
𝑒?𝐿 that makes ???𝐿′ 𝑒?𝐿  = 0: 








































? , (This by the definition of ???𝐿). 
 And, 
? − ? + 𝑒?𝐿 > ? 𝑝(𝑒?𝐿) 19 
 
The domain of definition for 𝑒?𝐿 involves that ? + 𝑒?𝐿 < ? and, then  ? − ? + 𝑒?𝐿 < 0 and is 
? 𝑝 𝑒?𝐿  > 0 which is positive, ? − ? + 𝑒?𝐿 > ? 𝑝(𝑒?𝐿) is a contradiction, then  𝑒?𝐿 ≥ 𝑒?𝐿. 
 
-  (b) Demonstration that 𝑒?𝐿 ≤ 𝑒∗ 
We compare ?? = 𝑒 + ?𝑝(𝑒)  and ???𝐿 = 𝑒 +  ? − 𝑒 𝑝(𝑒).  





But this time, we look for 𝑒?𝐿, 𝑒?𝐿 < 𝑒∗ and proceeding as above, we get: 


































? − ? + 𝑒∗ > ? 𝑝(𝑒∗) > 0 or, 
? 1 −  𝑝 𝑒∗   > ? − 𝑒∗ > 0 
𝑝 𝑒∗  is very small, and  1 −  𝑝 𝑒∗   near from 1, then the relationship is verified. 
 
-  (c) Demonstration that 𝑒?𝐿 ≤ 𝑒∗ 
This results from the relationships studied en (a) and (b).  
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